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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Problem
At the joint frontier of psychology and education
a new movement is emerging that attempts to
promote psychological growth directly through
educational courses, (Alschuler, 1969, p. 1).
These attempts are known by a variety of labels: affective education,
psychological education, confluent education, and humanistic education. The
emphasis in most of these attempts is a methodological one with great
attention being given to the development of pedogogical procedures that deal
more directly with the inner life of the learner. What is missing at this stage
of development are sets of criteria, constructs and assumptions which could
serve as a decision-making base for determining what the goals as well as the
procedures of these programs should be.
This study will be an attempt to extrapolate from the psychological-
philosophical sources of existentialism, phenomenology, perceptual theory and
humanistic psychology, those assumptions and constructs which are serving
and which might serve as a criterion for the development of humanistic,
affective, psychological, and confluent education.
Need
2
Humanistic education needs a psychological-philosophical base for
several reasons. A major reason is that a guideline for the direction of
curriculum development is necessary. With such a guideline, a sequence of
learning experiences, a curriculum, can be coherent and flexible. A
psychological-philosophical foimdation is also important in making value
choices, setting guidelines, organizing priorities and establishing goals.
Method and Hypothesis
I have chosen to examine existentialism, phenomenology, perceptual
theory and humanistic psychology; I have chosen those men, themes, and
assumptions, who, for me, have made contributions to psychological
education. For example, the themes of consciousness, intentionality,
subjectivity freedom, and decision-making are all themes which concern
psychological educators, and are dealt with extensively in the literature of
existentialism, phenomenology, perceptual theory and humanistic psychology.
By examining this literature from my personal viewpoint I will be able to
establish what I believe is a psychological-philosophical base for psychological
education. It is hypothesized that existentialism and phenomenology form an
important base for humanistic education. This study will trace the relationship
between the literature of existentialism and phenomenology, perceptual theory
and humanistic psychology, and the psychological-philosophic rationale for
humanistic education.
3Unlike traditional ontology, phenomenology does not view man from an
external position, but from inside the person himself. Psychologists who have
adopted this philosophical stance include Rogers (1959), Combs and Snygg
(1959), Maslow (1954), Allport (1940), Cantril (1959), and Peris (1969). The
existentialists address themselves to the wholeness of man's being.
The discoveries of perception offer scientific support for the basic
assumptions of phenomenology and existentialism. The problems of perception
will be discussed since they help us to understand what phenomenology is. It
is one of the major contentions of phenomenology that the way a person
perceives the world influences his behavior. Studies in perception point out
that "objective" experiments really depend on the scientist and his expectations
as a key variable in the outcome of the experiment, (Rosenthal 1969; Krutch,
1953; Fesbach and Singer 1957).
Chapter II consists of a review of the literature and a tentative definition
of humanistic education. It will show how humanistic psychology developed
out of two divergent schools of psychological thought, the behavioristic and the
psychoanalytic
.
Chapter III will attempt to fill out the previously missing need for a
philosophical psychological rationale for humanistic psychology. Understanding
the philosophical and psychological basis for humanistic psychology
will
provide a useful vantage point to view this new field in education.
This chapter
will be primarily concerned with the major themes and assumptions of
4phenomenology and existentialism that give information about humanistic
education.
Chapter IV will be an examination of perceptual theory and how studies
in perceptual theory offer support for,the phenomenological-existential position.
It will be more of a personal statement.
Chapter V will lay the foundations upon which humanistic education is
built. This foundation will in turn be based upon the explications of the
previous chapters. A conceptual schema will be developed in this chapter and
will emphasize the importance of the intentional teacher (Ivey, 1970), and the
intentional student (Weinstein and Fantini, 1970). Various approaches to
humanistic education will be analyzed to see how each mode grows from the
joint soil of phenomenological-existential philosophy, perceptual theory and
humanistic psychology.
The final part of this dissertation will be my personal committment to
humanistic education, and what I am going to do with this data.
Limitations
Existentialism is an unorganized and unsystemitized school of philosophical
thought. For this reason I am making a subjective choice of what to examine
and limiting the examination to specific areas. I will examine those men,
themes, and assumptions that I believe give information about humanistic
education.
5I will not examine the writings of the humanist of the middle ages to
establish a psychological-philosophical base.
6CHAPTER II
THE DEVELOPMENT OF HUMANISTIC PSYCHOLOGY
Introduction
In this chapter I will trace the development of humanistic psychology.
Humanistic psychology grew out of two other schools of psychology. I will
compare and contrast the two schools of psychology, behaviorism and
psychoanalysis, in the attempt to explain the development of humanistic
psychology. Gestalt therapy, a humanistic therapeutic approach, will also
be discussed because of my belief that Gestalt therapy, although not the only
humanistic psychological approach, is the most effective one and puts into
practice the assumptions and concepts of humanistic psychology. Assumptions
and concepts are meaningless for me unless they can have a practical applica-
tion. Gestalt therapy is a practical application of the themes and assumptions
of humanistic psychology. The final part of this chapter will be a summary of
the work of this chapter.
The Behaviorist Tradition
In psychology the most exacting scientific work has been done by the
behaviorists . Here, objective empirical evidence relating to overt stimulus
and response has been of primary importance. What is significant for purposes
7of this investigation, however, is that ,rbehaviorism is only minimally
concerned with the subjective and intuitive side of human behavior,
"
(Hall and
Lindsey, 1957). However, psychology was not always minimally concerned with
the subjective and intuitive side of behavior. Modern behaviorist psychology
is a revolt against the introspective and subjective psychology of William
Wundt. Wundt, who would not reconcile the mind/body split, substituted
"consciousness" for soul (Watson, 1967). Consciousness becomes then
something and everybody knows what it is. According to Wundt, we are being
conscious when we have a sensation, a perception, or thought or when we
desire to do something, (Watson, 1967).
Pavlov, and later Watson, led to the decline of Wundtian introspectionist
psychology, (Spence, 1960). Watson declares clearly his independence from
the interospectionist and consciousness dominated psychology of the period.
Psychology, as the behaviorist views it, is
a purely objective, experimental branch of
natural science which needs introspection as
little as do the sciences of chemistry and
physics. . . It can dispense with consciousness
in a psychological sense. The separate
observation of "states of consciousness" is,
on this assumption, no more a part of the
task of the psychologist than of the physicist.
We might call this the return to a non-
reflective and naive use of consciouness. In
this sense consciousness may be said to be the
instrument or tool with which all scientists
work, (Watson, 1913. p. 176).
8Watson believes that the data of psychology are exactly the same data
as the data of the physical sciences. He does not, as many people believe,
dismiss consciousness but believes that consciousness is a tool used by all
scientists,, psychologists and physicists alike. For Watson then the subject
matter of psychology should not be mental or conscious events as Wundt and his
followers believed, but should instead be matter, physical events or behavior,
(Spence, 1960).
Skinner supports this view when he states that "it doesn't make any
difference to me whether things are conscious or unconscious; the causality in
behavior does not depend upon awareness, " (Evans, 1968).
The growth of behaviorism should not be seen solely as a response to
introspectionism or the subjectivism of psjmhologists such as Wundt. It
aligned itself with the "scientific movement identified with Newton's celestial
mechanics, " (Matson, 1967). Psychologists sought rigor and reliability within
the physicist's parameters of impersonal objective observation, (ibid). The
behaviorist is concerned with the visible parts of the machine and admits that
he can only study parts of behavior, (Kanfer and Phillips, 1970).
The Contribution of Behavioristic Psychology to Humanistic Psychology
The behavioristic psychologist's focus on visible behavior is of crucial
importance for humanistic psychology. The humanistic psychologist in his
concern for the individuals actualization, becoming, values, identity, self-
actualization, and the exploration of self hopes that by changing present
9behavior the aforementioned goals might be reached. The humanistic
psychologists will therefore at times concentrate his efforts on changing
behavior in the belief that the individuals actualization, becoming, values,
identity, self-actualization, and the exploration of self might be facilitated.
Evidence shows that by concentrating on specific parts of a person's behavior,
the internal attitudes will undergo a concomitant change. It appears that
trying on new behaviors exerts strong influences on personal attitude (Breer
and Locke, 1965). The length of time the attitudinal change will endure after
experimenting with new behaviors is most directly related to the experiential
consequences of that change (Bandura, 1969).
Changed behavior and its subsequent influence on the growth, actualization
and values shows the important that behaviorism has for humanistic psychology.
This importance should not be underrated, even though the behaviorist never
deals directly with growth, actualization and values. The indirect method of
the behaviorist 1 of changing specific behaviors is of crucial importance for
humanistic psychology.
Behaviorism - A Brief Criticism
Behaviorism offers less help than it could because it does not deal with
consciousness. If consciousness is the method by which we come in contact
with the world, the examination of consciousness could be of crucial importance
for any scientist. Another criticism of behaviorist psychology is that it has
10
not achieved what its model physics has achieved. Physics has been very
successfu 1 in accounting for the behavior of certain objects. However, the
search for laws "which will account for the many special features in a
complicated phenomenon can meet with success only when the different
properties of bodies have been distinguished by processes of measurement, "
(Cohen and Nagel, 1960). Behaviorism has not yet mastered this requirement.
Finally, behavioristic theory does not say much about the structure or
development of personality. It never deals directly with what humanistic
psychologists call actualization, becoming, values, identity, self-actualization
or the exploration of self.
Psychoanalysis - Freudianism
Psychoanalysis is another important influence on humanistic psychology.
Freudian analysis has led to the development of many psychological theories.
The early Freudians developed the literature which described man as a dynamic
function. Freud also postulated a super-structure which he hoped would account
for man as a dynamic function. Man is an instinctual and social animal and
the interplay between these two forces gives rise to personality. Freud's
super-structure or topology is of course the now classic id (instinctual
primitive force), super ego (societal, learned force), and ego (the personality
or the most visible aspect of man's dynamic nature), (Freud, 1924). In fact,
we can see that Freud did lay the foundations for the development of ego
psychology. Freud's development of a theory of personality was again the
first systematic attempt to develop a general theory of human behavior.
Psychoanalysis is based on a 19th century physiology model. This
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model includes attraction and repulsion, conservation of energy, combination
of forces acting from within, and a general closed system of energy which is
enclosed in the organism, (Jones, 1953).
As Sutich and Vich point out, "psychoanalysis seems to have become
bogged down to the degree that it continues to hold to most of its original
premises," (1969). The psychoanalytic or Freudian concepts dominated most
psychological and psychiatric investigation. This domination was superceded
by the behaviorists' studying of abnormality, deviation and illness, (Sutich and
Vich, 1969; Moustakas, 1956). Freudianism in its attempt to explain man's
internal, unconscious and hidden dynamics have left unexplored healthy
behavior, (Moustakas, 1956).
Skinner's criticism of Freud helps clarify the Freudian position:
The Freudian mental apparatus doesn't make much
sense to me. Freud made some very important
contributions. As a determinist, he convinced
many people that things formerly believed to be
accidental were really lawful, and I think he
was right on that point. But in filling in the gap
between the events which he saw to be causally
related, he chose to construct or piece together an
elaborate system of mental events going on inside
the organism. This was particularly true when
he tried to relate the behavior of the adult to what
had happened to him as a child. Perhaps fifty
years elapse during which no evidence of a causal
effect is evident then suddently something happens
which looks as if it were related to an event that
happened to the individual as a child. Now, I
12
believe that there are connections of that kind,
but the Freudian formulation doesn’t very well
represent what happened, nor does it permit
one to trace it to current behavior, (Evans,
1968, pp„ 5-6).
Behaviorism and Psychoanalysis - Summary
The behaviorists and psychoanalysts based their practice upon rather
divergent views of man. The behaviorists were Newtonian in that both man
and his universe were viewed mechanistically. Man is a machine and by
studying the parts of the machine it is possible to understand man. The
psychoanalysts interpreted all behavior through a theoretical framework.
This framework was comprised of conscious states as well as the unconscious
states.
Both schools share one thing in common and this is crucial for the
understanding of humanistic psychology. Man is "essentially the victim-
spectator of blind force working through him, " (Matson, 1967). It makes no
difference whether the forces work from without as in behaviorism or from
within as in psychoanalysis. This is not the point as Matson points out in
Being, Becoming and Behavior :
Man is thus in the end a passive and reactive
structure, a neutral agent, rather than one
self activating and self actualizing. It is
his past condition and conditioning that pushes
him, not a vision of possibility that pulls
him, (1967, p. 15).
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Humanistic psychology is an out-growth of behaviorism and psychoanalysis
but the most direct origin is in the neo Freudian work of Horney, Fromm,
Goldstein, Adler and Jung. Understanding the neo Freudians will help us to
understand "that affirmative countermovement of humanistic psychology which
regards itself as a 'third force' standing between the poles of behaviorism and
Freudianism, " (Matson, 1967). The beginning of this counter movement
cannot be called humanistic psychology but is really neo Freudianism.
Neo-Freudians
Adler who does not consider himself a part of the Freudian position
because he himself had not been psychoanalyzed, helps link Freudian psychology
to humanistic psychology. Adler believes that early learning occurs in the
family group and the mother is the most influential member of this group.
Adler's motivational theory shows how humanistic psychology is related
to Freudian psychology. All behavior, for Adler, is directed at long and
short term goals. People pick counter productive routes to these goals and
Adler wants to help man find alternate routes to these goals. It is this
choosing or providing of alternatives that helps bridge the gap between Freudian
psychology and humanistic psychology. However, Adler's model of man is
still pathological and it is Jung wrho first emphasizes the positive side of man.
It was Jung's work as well as that of Horney, Fromm, Goldstein and
other Freudian heretics or neo-Freudians who place their emphasis on the
14
"constructive possibilities of mind and personality," (Matson, 1967), that
helped create a favorable climate for a more clearly defined and explicit
humanistic orientation in psychology, (Sutich and Vich, 1969). Jung was the
first man to offer a major shift in the psychological theory and practice from the
negative pathologically-oriented general theory expounded by Freud. He
moved to a positive philosophical conception of man and man's potentialities
for realizing his potentialities. It was Jung's work and his belief that
psychoanalysis must have as its ultimate purpose "the restoration of the total
personality.
. . the bringing into reality of the whole human being - that is,
individuation, " (Jung, 1967, p. 16).
As Goldstein points out there is only one drive and this drive is not
directed at a release of tension but at self-actualization. "This tendency to
actualize its nature, to actualize "itself, " is the basic drive by which the life
of the organism is determined," (Goldstein, 1956).
Horney also views man's positive side and is concerned with the
development of man's potential, self-expression, feelings, and relationship
with himself and others. "Only the individual himself can develop his given
potentials, " (Horney, 1956).
Fromm shows his close connection with the humanistic psychology in
particular in The Art of Loving. It is here that he elaborates on love as a
positive, active and growing process. Fromm believes man is free to choose
life, love, peace and understanding by actively working for love, life and
15
peace or war, death and the extinction of the race, (1956).
It is out of these beginnings that humanistic psychology sometimes
includes the aforementioned people as members; there is really no strict
dividing line. However, the leading figure in the area of humanistic psychology
is Abraham Maslow. Maslow's basic research has been the investigation of the
’’characteristics and behavior of self-actualizing persons,” (Winthrop, 1968).
Humanistic Psychology
Maslow's particular achievement has been to emphasize the positive side
of man, (Maslow, 1962). The potential for growth inherent in each individual
is given more credence. The ecstacy of personal growth through loving,
enjoying, achieving, and becoming develop as constructs of this new approach.
Maslow understood this chasm: "it is as if Freud supplied to us the sick half
of psychology and we must now fill it out with the healthy half, ” (1967).
It is Maslow who points out that the symptoms of guilt, bad conscience,
anxiety, depression, and inferiority feelings indicate sickness and when taken
away indicate health. He clearly rejects this facile distinction of health as
symptom free and sickness as possessing the above symptoms.
In essence I am deliberately rejecting our
present easy distinction between sickness
and health, at least as far as surface
symptoms are concerned. Does sickness
mean having symptoms ? I maintain now
that sickness might consist of not having
symptoms when you should. Does health
mean being symptom-free? I deny it.
16
Which of the Nazis at Auschwitz or Dachau
were healthy ? Those with stricken
conscience or those with a nice, clear
happy conscience? Was it possible for a
profoundly human person not to feel
conflict, suffering, depression, rage, etc,”
(1967, p. 171).
Maslow contends that preventing a person or child from growing through their
pain (i.e.
,
becoming) is a false protection implying lack of respect for the
integrity and growth potential for mankind. Allport and Moustakas share this
view also. This is not to say that psychoanalysis and behavior psychology
reject this view; it does seem, however, that humanistic psychology emphasizes
this view.
Like Maslow, Allport's theories of personality are open and positive.
According to Allport, man is free to act and is not pushed and shoved by either
internal or external forces which are beyond his control. In this essentially
optimistic view of man, man is always in control of his fate. When he is not
in control of his fate, it is because he doesn't want to be in control, (Allport,
1967).
For Allport, man is always in process. His personality is never a
finished product. Even though each person has things in common with the
species, he is also unique and must be understood only in relation to his
particular context. In the introduction to Becoming , Allport writes:
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I have written this essay because I feel that
modern psychology is in a dilemma. Broadly
speaking, it has trimmed down the image of
man that gave birth to the democratic dream.
. .
Up to now the "behavioral sciences, " including
psychology, have not provided us with a picture
of man capable of creating or living in a
democracy.
. „ They have delivered into our
hands a psychology of an "empty organism, "
pushed by drives and moded by environmental
circumstance.
. .
But the theory of democracy
requires also that man possess a measure of
rationality, a portion of freedom, a generic
conscience, propriate ideals, and unique value.
We cannot defend the ballot box or liberal
education, nor advocate free discussion and
democratic institutions, unless man has the
potential capacity to profit therefrom, (1967, p. 160).
Moustalcas, another spokesman for humanistic psychology, also writes
of actualization and growth. The actualization of one's potentials or one's
self only takes place when "the person is felt and experienced as a sheer
personal being, " (1956). It is only when each individual's unique experience
is examined in the context of the unique individual that meaning and value are
present. Moustakas has several principles which help summarize his basic
approach to the recognition of the self; the central tenents are based on the
individual knowing himself better than anyone else, and the individual as the
only one who can develop his potentialities. Every individual wants to grow
toward self fulfillment (ibid).
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Sidney Jourard focuses on another aspect of openness. Jourard asks,
(1964), ’’shall we permit our fellow man to know us as we, or shall we seek
instead to remain an enigma, an uncertain quantity?" (1964). This choice has
always been available to man and Jourard believes, as I do, that we have
always chosen to hide behind various masks and roles. What puzzles Jourard
is that we have not questioned this decision to hide behind various masks
and roles, but instead have assumed that self-concealment is the most natural
state for grown men. Those who do reveal themselves Jourard points out,
are seen sometimes as childish, crazy, or naive, (ibid). Under certain
conditions, however, man will open up and give up his roles without having to
use strategies of getting drunk, reporting dreams, or interpreting inkblots.
Jourard discusses the above problems and concludes that a person who
plays his roles suitably may be considered normal. He believes "normal
personalities, however, are not necessarily, healthy personalities, " (ibid).
The healthy person is one who not only plays his roles satisfactorily but at
me same time derives personal satisfaction from the enactment of me i o Le
,
keeps growing, and maintains a higher level oi wellness, (ibid).
Gestalt Therapy - A Humanistic Therapeutic Approach
Gestalt therapy is the approach that appears to be the most direct \\3.y
of achieving actualization. The Gestaltist believes in what Arnold Beisser
calls the "paradoxical theory of change," (^970). ihis is cnange ‘-hat occurs
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when a person becomes what he is, ’'not when he tries to become what he is
not, ” (ibid). Therefore one can only change when one takes the time and makes
the effort to be what he is and to be fully invested in what he is. It is only by
rej ecting the role of being a change agent that a psychologist can make
meaningful change possible, (Ibid). A Gestaltist makes change possible by not
trying to change but by allowing the person to be what he is.
An example:
Patient: I want to be happy.
Therapist: So be happy.
Patient: I don't know how to be happy.
Therapist: So don’t know.
Patient: What do I do now ?
Therapist: What do you want to do ?
Patient: I want
Therapist: So do - so don't do.
Only by staying with the patient or the person, going with him, allowing
him to be, and him to choose to be, can the patient be, (Beisser, 1970).
Fritz Peris, the foimder of Gestalt therapy believes Gestalt therapy is one of
the humanistic, existential forces in psychology which stands on its own feet,
and works on the awareness principle, on phenomenology, (Peris, 1959).
In contrast to both behaviorism and psychoanalysis the humanistic
psychology also takes a holistic or organismic view of man. This view treats
20
ni3.il 3s 3 unified whole in much the S3me W3y 3s Goldstein 3nd Maslow view
man. The organismic approach to man is supported by almost all humanistic
psychologists, and Gestalt therapy offers a slightly different viewpoint from
other humanistic psychologists.
For Peris, if the whole is broken up into its components the essence of
the whole that was there disappears. This simply means that the parts are
less than the whole, and if not less, Peris concedes that the parts may be
viewed as another Gestalt although a weaker one, (ibid).
It is with this view of man in mind, (i.e.
,
the parts of man as something
less than that whole man) that the Gestalt therapist considers all that is going
on in a person. This includes thinking, feeling, remembering, doing, (both
verbal and non-verbal) remembering and sensing as the behavioral data
(Kepner and Brien, 1970). Gestalt therapy then can be translated into a
behavioristic-phenomenological framework. This requires an understanding of
what laws the behaviorist and phenomenologist use. Both the behaviorist and
phenomenologist consider learning to be a lawful phenomenon whose laws can
be discovered.
The only legitimate subject matter for psychology to study, according
to the behaviorist, is observable behavior, (Kepner and Brien, 1970).
Observable behavior is "the only criterion against which the outcome of any
experimental procedure, including psychotherapy, can be evaluated. The
phenomenologist studies learning as well as other behavior through the report
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of individuals, sensory, perceptual or cognitive data, (ibid). He considers
what goes on inside a person; this includes the person's sensations, perception,
and cognition. What a person is experiencing is valid psychological data
even though these e.vents cannot be verified but must be labeled hypothetical
constructs by another person, (ibid). The phenomenologist further believes
that changes in such constructs as self-concept, self-awareness or ego control
are acknowledged by the phenomenologist as valid psychological data and a
valid criteria against which the outcome of therapy can be appraised, (ibid).
The behavioristic phenomenologist cr Gestalt therapist lives in the best
of all possible worlds. Like the behaviorist, he is "concerned with and
attempts to account for external events, that is, for stimuli and responses;”
and like the phenomenologist is concerned with the rich, varied and elusive
internal world that goes on within each individual, (ibid). Kepner and Brien
conclude that:
The behaviorist is primarily concerned with
and attempts to account for external events,
that is, for stimuli and responses. The
phenomenologist, on the other hand, assumes
certain "givens" about the nature of man and
is concerned with what goes on inside the
person, that is, with the rich, varied, and
"elusive internal world" that goes on within
each individual. The behavioristic
phenomenologist deals with this world of personal
experiencing in such a way as to make it
external, overt, specifiable, and communicable,
(ibid, p. 45).
22
A model of behavior has been proposed in the attempt to overcome the
limitation of the S-R behavioral model. A two stage model has been developed
to replace the single state S-R which fails to handle processes such as
ideation, cognition and meaning, (Kepner and Brien, 1970). The two stage
behavioral model S
s _ r
R attempts to mediate between the observable S and
observable R. "The s-r refers to a covert process and might represent, for
example, a listener's meaningful reaction to something just said (r) and the
self-stimulation or thinking that the reaction triggers (s), both of which might
lead to some overt responding, " (ibid, p. 41).
In this model phenomenological events can be regarded as internal
mediating responses or intervening variables. It appears that at present an
increasingly fruitful and useful interchange is developing between phenomenology
and behaviorism. It seems that man is finally being recognized at once as
both a collection of habits and behaviors, and a whole being (ibid).
It is easy to understand humanistic psychology as an outgrowth of the
neo-Freudian position stressing the importance of consciousness, as well as
the behaviorist's stress on the importance of behavior. The paradigm of
humanistic psychology is that it still retains the S-R of the behaviorist but adds
to this S-R, S^-R-l so that this model now looks like Ss i_ r iR.
Another view of humanistic psychology is that it is based on Einstein's
model of the universe which is now the accepted model. This model is an
organismic model in which the parts do not make the whole, or where the
23
whole is greater than the parts. What is important about relativity theory is
that within it there is a place for Newtonian physics. It is not that Newtonian
physics is wrong so much as that it only describes a part of what is going on.
Einsteinian physics describes more and incorporates Newtonian physics in it.
The same is true of humanistic psychology. It is not so much that
behaviorism and Freudian are wrong as behaviorism and Freudian only
describes a part. It is for this reason that humanistic psychology using the
existential phenomenological approach that includes both the internal feelings
and attitudes as well as the external observable behavior to describe more of
what man is, is more akin to the Einsteinian scientific model.
It is easy to see that humanistic psychology is a new and daring field
and is challenging some very basic psychological concepts.
Summary
In this chapter I have attempted to show how humanistic psychology
developed out of two other psychological schools of thought, behaviorism and
psychoanalysis. The contributions of both behaviorism and psychoanalysis
to humanistic psychology were crucial and necessary for humanistic psychology
to develop.
Gestalt therapy, a humanistic therapeutic approach, shows how both the
non-observable internal world as well as observable behavioral world can be
incorporated into a humanistic approach.
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The assumption, goals and central concept of humanistic psychology
showed clearly the focus of this new movement. The goals of actualization,
becoming, etc. and the assumption that man's fate is not determined by either
external or internal forces showed the focus of humanistic psychology.
Knowing the assumptions, goals and concepts of humanistic psychology
helps one understand the assumptions, goals, concepts, and parameters of
humanistic education. Humanistic education tries to implement the goals of
humanistic psychology and is based on the same assumptions and concepts as is
humanistic psychology. Humanistic education tries to implement procedures
so that the achievement of humanistic psychological goals can be implemented
in an educational setting.
The need remains for a more precise direction, a set of guide lines and
an organization of priorities to clearly implement these goals. The next
chapters will continue to establish a psychological and philosophical base on
which this unmet need can be met.
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CHAPTER III
A PSYCHOLOGICAL-PHILOSOPHICAL BASE FOR HUMANISTIC
EDUCATION-PHENOMENOLOGY-EXISTENTIALISM
Introduction
This chapter will attempt to establish a psychological-philosophical base
for humanistic education by examining those men, themes, and assumptions,
who for me, have assumptions to contribute to humanistic education. In the first
section I will show the difficulty and confusion that exists when trying to write
about existentialism and phenomenology. The next section will be devoted
entirely to phenomenology. In this section I will trace the development of
subjective and objective knowledge and phenomenological knowledge, and show
how this leads to the development of the phencmenological method - intentionality.
The phenomenological method is a way of looking at subjective, objective
and phenomenological knowledge. I will trace the development of the
phenomenological method and the concept of intentionality historically, and my
major emphasis will first be placed on Husserl's development of his theory of
intentionality. After tracing this development I will then show how the concept
of intentionality has been redefined by Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger, Sartre and
Kelly to become more of an existential concept. In the third part I will examine
the concept of anxiety in the hope of explicating the existential position. In this
section other existential themes (choice making, freedom, nothingness) will be
discussed as they are explicated through the discussion of the concept of
anxiety.
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Phenomenological-Existential Confusion
To write or talk about an existential system is impossible because as
some existentialists believe, once we systematize existentialism, we are no
longer being existential, (Wild, 1966, Kaufman, 1957). It is precisely this
refusal to belong to any school of thought, its repudiation as inadequate any
body of beliefs and systems, its dissatisfaction with the superficial, remote
and academic traditional philosophy that is the heart of existentialism, (Kaufman,
1957). The protagonists of existentialism have traced it back to the Bible,
(Kaufman, 1957). In our time writers who have claimed to be existentialists
don’t agree on any one cardinal point, (MacIntyre, 1964). There are existential
atheists, such as Sartre, and existential theists, such as Kierkergaard, and any
one formula that would embrace all the major tendencies of existentialism would
have to be so broad and general that it would be meaningless, (MacIntyre, 1964).
We find the same difficulty and confusion when we come to phenomenology,
for as Friedman points out,
The leading phenomenologists were not themselves
existentialists, and many existentialists are not, or
are only very secondarily, phenomenologists. This
makes it impossible to understand existentialism
without phenomenology, but equally impossible to
understand it by means of phenomenology alone, as
some have tried to do, (1964, p. 69).
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Natanson elaborates on this difficulty. Phenomenology has been usually
misunderstood and it has been taken as "a kind of mysticism, a Bergsonian
intuitionism, an anti-scientific doctrine and philosophy that denies the reality
of the world, " (1966). To add further to the confusion is the complex relation-
ship that historically exists between the work of Heidegger, Husserl and Sartre.
This difficulty is further compounded by the fact that much of Husserl's work is
not completely known and is just now being edited and published, and during
Husserl's own lifetime much of his work underwent important developments,
(Natanson, 1966).
One can see that there is much difficulty in clearly separating existentialism
from phenomenology. However, I have decided for the purposes of this
investigation and to make clarity possible to separate phenomenology from
existentialism.
Rollo May reinforces this separation when he summarizes the differences
between phenomenological and existential analysis:
1. Existential analysis does not restrict itself to the
investigation of states of consciousness, but takes
into account the entire structure of existence of
the individual.
2. Whereas phenomenology had emphasized the unity
of the individual's inner world of experience,
existential analysis emphasizes that one individual
may live in two or more sometimes conflicting
"worlds. "
3. Phenomenology takes into account only immediate
subjective worlds of experience. Existential
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analysis strives to reconstruct the development
and transformations of the individual's "world"
or conflicting "worlds," (May, 1958).
Existentialism differs from phenomenology because it operates in a
larger frame of reference, (ibid).
Phenomenology - Subjective Knowledge
Cail Rogers in an article Toward A Science of the Person
,
discusses the
problem of subjective and objective knowledge. Rogers describes subjective
knowledge in the following way: "Within myself - from within my own internal
frame of reference - I may "know" that I love or hate, sense, perceive,
comprehend. I may believe or disbelieve, enjoy or dislike, be interested in or
bored by, " (Rogers, 1969).
The above are all subjective hypotheses which I may check by asking
myself questions such as, "How do I know I really hate her. " After asking
myself this question I may realize that it is not hate which I feel but something
else, perhaps envy or jealousy. The same process could be gone through when
I ask myself, "How do I know I love her" and then realize what I feel is
admiration. This is what Rogers calls subjective knowledge. It is knowledge
that one checks on with one’s self.
Rogers gives other examples of subjective knowing. What do I experience
when I taste a foreign food? I may ask, "Do I like that food?" Rogers believes
that it is only by referring to the flow of my experiencing that I can sense the
implicit meanings and conclude, "I like its flavor but not its consistency. "
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These hypotheses are always being more sharply defined and differentiated
and in this subjective knowing become more precise and accurate. Psychotherapy
is a good example of this sharpening. When the patient discovers the word
that more accurately describes his feelings, or perceptions, there is a real
sense of relief. This new sharply differentiated knowing in contrast to the
vague knowing previously present permits the client "to be more congruent within
himself, " (Rogers, 1969). This method of knowing is certainly not infallible and
for this reason little attention is given to it today. This kind of knowing does
not lead to publicly validated knowledge and yet seems to be "our most basic
way of knowing, " (ibid).
American science, especially American psychology, has greatly ignored
what Rogers calls "the creative inner hypotheses which is checked and re-checked
against the relevant aspects of one's experiencing, and which may then eventuate
as the formal hypotheses to be operationally tested, " (ibid).
However, the subjective way of knowing is an important and extremely
valuable way of knowing and perhaps should be given more attention as the
source or way the hypotheses is formed. The following example of hypotheses
formation offers a clear example of subjective knowledge. A relevant
hypothesis is formed and his hypothesis can come from any source - 'intuition,
trial and error, past experience, accident, imagination, even a dream,
'
(Madden, 1960, p. 7). It appears the subjective knowledge is as crucial to
science as it is to personal affairs.
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How We Know - Objective Knowing;
In turning our attention to objective knowing we find that the hypotheses
are no longer checked against an internal frame of reference as in introspective
Wundtian framework but are checked both by externally observable operations
in the Galelian model and by "making empathic inferences regarding the
reactions of a trusted reference group, usually one's colleagues, " (Rogers,
1969).
When a physicist says that he knows that the formula V equals 32t
(v = velocity in feet per second and t = time in seconds) he is really saying that
individuals that he trusts have gone through precisely defined operations,
observed similar results, and "arrived at a similar subjective conviction"
expressed by that formula and "is understood in a similar manner by all, " (ibid).
Physicists and chemists of all nations are in agreement about the facts.
The language barrier is not of importance because these sciences have created
their own language of signs and symbols in which the subjective element appears
to be completely divorced. The natural sciences deal only v/ith what is observed
in the world of matter.
The objective way of knowing transforms all that is studied into objects.
Objective knowing consists of data and phenomena that are observable and
reproducible. Rogers believes "objectivity can only be concerned with objects,
whether these are animate or inanimate. Associated with this kind of knowing
are terms such as objective, behaviorist, impersonal and operational (ibid).
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Interpersonal Knowing or Phenomenological Knowledge
For lack of a better term, Rogers describes a third way of knowing and
says that, "Logically somewhere in between the two types of knowing I have
discussed is a third mode, " (Rogers, 1969). He calls this third mode, for
lack of a better term, Interpersonal Knowing or Phenomenological Knowledge.
This mode applies primarily to human beings.
In this kind of ’'knowing" I "know" that you were hurt by my remark, or
you hate yourself, or you are really concerned about the world being destroyed
by thei mo-nuclear war. This "knowing" like the knowing described earlier are
all hypotheses, but I use my skill and whatever "empathic understanding is at
my command to get at the relevant aspect of your phenomenological field, to get
inside your private world of meanings and see whether my understanding is
correct. To do this I may simply ask you, which is usually inadequate, or I
may observe your tone, gestures, words or create a climate that makes it safe
for you "to reveal your internal frame of reference, " (ibid).
The hypotheses in this way of knowing are tested "by relating them to the
most accurate picture we can obtain of the internal frame of reference of this
individual, " (ibid). The knowledge that is gained is of a particular individual
"but from this knowledge generalizations can be formed which can be tested in
the same manner, " According to Rogers, 'It provides us with scientific leverage
in getting at the non-observable events which go on within the individual. "
The criteria for this kind of knowledge are either the individual confirms my
hypotheses about his internal frame of reference or the inferences about his
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internal frame of reference are confirmed by consensual validation, (ibid).
Subjective
-Objective - Phenomenological Knowing; - A Summary of How We Know
This argument is an old one, and embraces two epistomological positions -
i.e.
,
subjective knowing vs. objective knowing. The argument between subjective
knowing and objective knowing is one that continues today, and its psychological
origins can be traced to Wilhelm Wundt, the founder of modern psychology.
Wundt believed that the psychologist uses a method of investigation entirely
different from the physicists. He examines by introspectively analyzing the
contents of his own conscious experience. Physicists examine the external
world while psychologists examine the internal world.
It was the failure of introspection as a reliable method of investigation
that eventually led to a new framework or model of logical structure of science
which is more akin to the Galilean model. Even within the modern Galilean
model of psychology, the same objective vs. subjective split is readily observable.
The behaviorist school believes that theoretical concepts must be closely tied
to "observable concepts in order to insure a maximum of empirical meaning,
"
(Madden, 1960).
It would appear that there is little difference between phenomenological
knowing and subjective knowing; there is, hovever, one crucial difference.
The crucial difference is that in phenomenological knowing you get in contact
with someone else's unique interaction with the world. 1 his contact takes
place even though no one can know how anyone else really experiences the world.
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This kind of knowing is highly personal and really interpersonal. Rogers
conception of phenomenological knowing is primarily concerned with the
interaction of human beings, one human being with another.
The very important question that I feel this argument between subjective
objective and phenomenological knowing still leaves unanswered is, "How do we
know? Do we know subjectively, objectively, phenomenologically or a
combination of the three? It is Husserl, the father of phenomenology, who
directs himself to answering this question.
Phenomenology - How We Know
The Phenomenological Method - Intentionality
The phenomenological method is a mode for interacting with the intra-
personal, interpersonal and the external world. This means you can approach
these three things phenomenologically. Using Husserl's phenomenological
method one can look at intrapersonal knowing or man's relationship to himself,
interpersonal knowing or man's relationship to other men, and man's relation-
ship to the world. The one basic charactieristic in the phenomenological method
is becoming conscious of your consciousness and your unique interacting with
any of these three referents.
In order to understand and explicate the phenomenological method, one
must understand the concept of intentionality which is inextricably bound up in
the phenomenological method.
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Before I begin with Husserl's explication of intentionality and the
phenomenological method, however, it is important to understand some
distinctions made by Kant. It was Kant who gave phenomenology a new and
broader definition as a result of his broader redefinition of phenomena. This
broadening resulted in a redefinition of phenomenology. What Kant did was to
distinguish objects and events as they appear in our experience from objects
and events per se which appear independently of the forms imposed on them by
our mind. He called the former "phenomena"; and the latter, "noumena" or
things in themselves. Kant thought that all we can ever know are phenomena,
(Kant, 1950).
Hegel tried to show that Kant was wrong and traced the development of the
mind through various stages, stages in which it apprehends itself as phenomenon,
"to the point of its full development, where it is aware of itself as it is in itself -
as noumena," (Schmitt, 1967).
Husserl and Brentano, who were both dissatisfied with traditional
philosophy, focused their attention on the "intentional structure of human
awareness that is always related to, or stretch out toward, its object, " and
concluded that consciousness began with mental acts. These acts however
are essentially related to their objects. Husserl soon saw "that the traditional
conception of an external world beyond our immediate awareness was
incompatible with the intentional structure of our lived experience, (Wild,
1966).
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Husserl's descriptive phenomenology studied the "parallel structures
of intentionality, " i.e.
,
the intended objects and the intending acts without a
pronounced preference for either the intended acts or the intended objects.
The conclusion that Husserl came to was that "the subject pole of this relation
was the decisive one. " He believed that in order to have an adequate under-
standing and justification of our knowledge it was necessary to have "a deeper
exploration of the subject, in which he (Husserl) came to see the source or
origin of all object knowledge," (Natanson, 1966). The phenomenological
method is dependent upon us being conscious as we intend. Without a
consciousness we couldn't be aware of the subjective nature of our experience.
It is this subjective experience which Husserl sees as the source of all object
knowledge. So even when we try to get in contact with our subjective knowing
experience, objective knowing experience, or phenomenological knowing
experience, Husserl suggests using the phenomenological method which entails
the understanding of the transcendental ego and the transcendental reduction.
The Transcendental Ego - And the Transcendental Reduction
It is necessary in order to understand the world and the basic intentions
which constitute the world to "gain a position outside it" from which it can be
viewed as a whole together with the basic intentions which make it possible for
it to be viewed as a whole, (Wild, 1963). The transcendental ego is Husserl's
name for the phenomenological observer or person in such an extra-worldly
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position. The gaining of this position from which our whole subjective
-objective
existence in the world could be objectively viewed, "is the transcendental re-
duction, " (ibid).
Herbert Spiegelberg describes this method:
It began as an operation of "bracketing" or
suspending our belief in the existence of the
phenomena under investigation. But almost
unnoticeably it became an elaborate procedure
by which Husserl tried to trace all phenomena
back to subjectivity, to an irreducible core of
absolute consciousness, a transcendental
subject. Here Husserl believed he could uncover
the intentional acts by which the whole objective
world was constituted, (1966, p. 139).
It is not that the phenomenologist denies the existence of the outer world;
he does not. He makes up his mind, for this analytical purpose, to temporarily
suspend belief in its existence (Schultz, 1966). He refrains intentionally from
all judgements related directly or indirectly to the existence of the outer world.
Husserl called this procedure putting the world in brackets or performing the
phenomenological reduction, (ibid).
As Husserl saw it, the whole phenomenological method required an
abandonment of the outwardly directed attitude which usually dominates our
daily lives. He believed we must become conscious of our original attitudes
and meanings. In order to become conscious of these original attitudes we
must be aware that all conscious acts have a fundamental directional cnaracter,
(Natanson, 1966). Therefore when one thinks the thinking is thinking of or
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about something, all remembering is remembering of something and all
consciousness, then, is consciousness of something. Chapman, (1966) in his
essay ’’Realism - Phenomenology" elaborates on this point when he says,
"consciousness in all its modes is awareness of something. " When thinking and
thinking of something, when perceiving, and perceiving something. He further
elaborates on this point:
Thus, as in thinking I have a thought of something,
so in sensing I have a sensation of something,
in perceiving I have a perception of something,
in experiencing an experience of something, in
conceiving a conception of something, in judging
a judgement (proposition) about something, and
so on, (Chapman, 1966, p. 104).
Using the phenomenological method - intentionality, one becomes aware
of the intended directional character and understands that the subject, in the
relationship between subject and object, is the origin of all object knowledge.
Understanding that the subject is the origin of all object knowledge (subjective,
objective, phenomenological) resolves the subject-object split. There is no
distinction between subject and object according to the phenomenological method.
Existentialism
The Phenomenological Method - Intentionality
Husserl’s foremost existential student, Martin Heidegger, rejects the
notions of the transcendental ego and the transcendental reduction. Sartre,
considered to be an existentialist, and Merleau-Ponty, a phenomenologist
(this demonstrates the confusion of trying to clearly separate existentialism
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from phenomenology) both agree with Heidegger that there is no transcendental
ego and transcendental reduction. They believe that Husserl was mistaken in
believing that all consciousness is intentional and outwardly directed because
there is another kind of consciousness, one that knows itself, not objectively
but in the very act, (Wild, 1963). They take the view that it is possible to be-
come aware of myself as well as my situation in the world by developing and
cultivating a consciousness that inhibits my intentional acts as they reach out
toward their objects, (Wild, 1966).
John Wild gives an example of this kind of consciousness:
Thus I do not have to watch myself walking from
an external point of view. There is a mode of
awareness that dwells in my walking, and which
gives me the feel of walking as I walk. It also
stretches around me and beyond me to reveal
the direction in which I am moving and how fast.
It is true that, for the most part, this immediate
consciousness is submerged and repressed by my
awareness of objects. But it can be developed
and made explicit by the right sort of phenomenological
attention, (1963, p. 33).
Merleau-Ponty gives another example:
For example, I may have been under the impression
that I lapsed into silence through weariness, or some
minister may have thought he had uttered merely an
appropriate platitude, yet my silence or his words
immediately take on a significance, because my
fatigue or his falling back upon a ready-made
formula are not accidental, for they express a
certain lack of interest, and hence some degree of
adoption of a definite position in relation to the
situation, (1969, p. 227).
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Both Heidegger and Sartre stress a more developed consciousness of the
I_in the action. Heidegger says the I_is always in the action, and can be summoned
through recollection, or the right sort of phenomenological attention. The
implication is that this is always part of our existence because we intend
naturally. There is no special effort needed. Sartre emphasizes the
consciousness of the I^in the action and focus on thej. in the action. Sartre puts
more emphasis on action or choice making. The taking of action is a should
for Sartre. Action is making choices, and making choices is a way to get in
touch with the_I in the action. Sartre wants us to make choices. Heidegger
believes there is no special effort needed.
Humanistic Education is more akin to the Sartreian position. One must
make choices in order to get in touch or become conscious of the _I in the action.
Thus both consciousness and choice making are crucial to humanistic education.
Consciousness or Intentionally and Freedom
Kelly clarifies the relationship of intentionality or consciousness and
freedom. If freedom is understood as transcending the phenomenological field
by being conscious of that field then it is clear that freedom depends on
consciousness. On the other hand, if one is not conscious of the phenomenological
field, then one is not free.
If one believes, as Kelly apparently does, that the actions of a
person are
determined by the phenomenal field, then the person has no choice and can be
neither free nor responsible. Kelly maintains in the Psychology
of Personal
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Constructs (1955), that a person's behavior is determined by those constructs
he uses to define the choice making situation When a person adopts a particular
construct his behavior is determined by the construct, but the person is free to
redefine and change those constructs and move to a higher or superordinate
construct system, (Kelly, 1955). Depending on how Kelly is understood his
position could be considered either a deterministic or free one, and Kelly
maintains, "that freedom and determinism are two sides of the same coin, "
(ibid).
Kelly and Heidegger believe man can only be free when he is conscious
of this subjective side of his viewing the world and it is his becoming conscious
of this very subjectivity that enables him to transcend the constructs of that
phenomenological view and gain another view which he can also become
conscious of. If a person is not conscious, then he cannot be free.
Adelbert Ames seems to clarify this existential question for me: He
believes that free will is inconceivable unless the possibility of choice exists,
and the choices are known to the chooser. The choices must be in the choosers
consciousness, (Ames, 1960). However, the paradox of consciousness, as
Sartre. points out in Nausea (1964), is that total consciousness or awareness or
intentionality, leads to paralysis. Other existentialists have seen consciousness
in a different light. In Beyond Good and Evil (1955) and Thus Spake Zarathiustra
(1966) we see Nietzsche expound the view that the gayest thing that can happen
to man is to reach self consciousness. On the other hand, Dostoevsky in Notes
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from Underground (1957) shows his underground man to be constantly suffering
as a result of achieving self consciousness.
This does not mean that you become frozen at either end of this continuum
but that consciousness is on a continuum. It is up to the individual to chose how
conscious he wants to be.
Existentialism - The Role of Anxiety
It is necessary to understand anxiety in order to understand personal
existence, and yet, Kierkegaard was the first modern thinker who recognized
the role of anxiety in normal life. Until that time it was regarded as a "morbid
symptom of some kind" that was of some importance for abnormal psychology.
Recently another view of anxiety has prevailed and this view stresses the
importance of anxiety and the role it plays in human existence, (Wild, 1966).
Heidegger's theory of anxiety is right now the most carefully thought out
and widely accepted, (Wild, 1966). In Being and Time , (1969), Heidegger
explains anxiety.
Anxiety is not only anxiety in the face of something,
but, as a state-of-mind, it is also anxiety about
something. That which anxiety is profoundly
anxious (sich abangstet) about is not a definite kind
of Being for Dasein or a definite possibility for it.
Indeed, the threat itself is indefinite, and therefore
cannot penetrate threateningly to this or that factually
concrete potentiality -for-being. That which anxiety
is anxious about is Being-in-the-world itself. In
anxiety what is environmentally ready-to-hand sinks
away, and so, in general, do entities within-the-world.
The "world" can offer nothing more, and neither can
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the Dasein-with of Others. Anxiety thus takes away
from Dasein the possibility of understanding itself,
as it falls, in terms of the ’’world" and the way things
have been publicly interpreted. Anxiety throws
Dasein back upon that which it is anxious about - its
authentic potentiality-for-Being-in-the-world, ’’
(Heidegger, 1969, p. 137).
Heidegger in his use of the term existence is not using it in the Thomistic
sense. In the Thomistic conception, existence would be translated as "existing"
or being "actual, " its opposite would be "not existing, " "not being, " For
Heidegger existence, is the character or essence of the Person (Dasein),
(ibid 1969). Saying the essence of a person is his existence is not saying that
a person essentially is, but it is rather saying that a person is defined in terms
of possible ways for him to be. Existence of the person is not some quality which
one could say a person possesses it is rather that a person is defined in terms
of his potentials to be this rather than that. It is the person who chooses to
realize these possibilities that are definitive of the person. The realizability
or not realizability of these possibilities are the person’s choice, (M)lina, 1969).
It could be said instead of Sartre’s dictum of existence preceding essence;
Heidegger's interpretation would say that a person's having possibilities of
being this or that way precedes his being finally that way, (ibid). Jaspers is in
accord with Heidegger on this point and explains in Reason and Existenz that
there is no final content to Existenz; it is always becoming, moving, on the
way, (Jasper, 1955).
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In anxiety no definite thing or object can be identified. If asked what he is
anxious about he will reply, '1 don't know, notning really. " Anxiety is not like
fear in that in anxiety "my very being is at stake, " (Wild, 1963). There is no
way that an answer to anxiety may be given by a calculating machine or another
person. Anxiety is my own responsibility and no one else's. I must deal with
it. However, anxiety may be evaded.
It is possible to run away from my anxiety when it starts to encircle me.
"I may regard it as a morbid delusion, deciding to be sensible" and go about my
business, (Wild, 1963, p. 24). I face risks in doing the above but these risks
"are no longer a misty nothingness but definite dangers against which definite
precautions may be taken, " (ibid). Wild comments:
This depersonalization of existence is, in fact,
the easier way. Hence we may be able to glimpse
what Heidegger means by his statement that the
impersonal one of everyday life (das Man) is
constantly evading his anxiety and attempting to
replace it by derived forms of fear, " (p. 24).
Nothingness and Anxiety
The no-thing-ness in this theory of anxiety is strangely reminiscent of
the impasse in Gestalt therapy. Frederick Peris describes this nothingness:
At first the patient will do anything to keep his
attention from his actual experiences. He will
take flight into memory and expectation (past
and future); into the flight of ideas (free
associations); intellectualizations or "ma.king a
case" or right and wrong. Finally, he encounters
the holes in his personality with an awareness of
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nothing (no-thing-ness), emptiness, void, and the
impasse, " (1966).
However, it is only through anxiety that man encounters nothingness. It
is in the encounter with nothingness that he becomes aware of the necessity to
die and his own finitude. Only through this encounter and the resolution and
reappraisal of himself can man make real choices and achieve what Heidegger
calls "authentic existence, " (Wild, 1963).
A crucial part after the encounter with nothingness is the choice making-
process; freedom and choice are central themes of existentialism. Even
Sartre's dictum that existence precedes essence, and Heidegger's elaboration
of that theme in his anxiety theory as a person "having possibilities of being this
way or that way precedes his being finally that way, " (Molina, 1969), really
means no more than that men's natures are not fixed or limiting or that man's
nature determines his choice. It is rather that their choices bring whatever
their nature is into being (MacIntyre, 1964). The crucial nature of freedom
and choice is central to the doctrine of existentialism and anxiety helps clarify
this.
Anxiety and Fear
In fear, one is afraid of something definite. If a person who was fearfm
were asked what they were afraid of they would be able to tell you. I am afraid
of that man, or I am afraid of this examination. The things that I know I fear
can be both dangerous and strong. However, one may take precautions toward
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such dangers. Usually fears are shared by others, but even if not shared, one
can get assistance or advice.
Summary
This chapter has focused on phenomenology and existentialism and
attempted to draw certain assumptions from existentialism and phenomenology
for humanistic education. The major assumptions that were drawn after
explicating the phenomenological methods are these:
1. The subject, in the relationships between subject
and object, is the origin of all object knowledge.
Object knowledge includes myself as subject
(subjective knowledge), the world as subject
(object knowledge), and others as subject
(phenomenological knowledge).
2. There is no subject-object split.
3. Consciousness or intentionality are crucial. Man
can only be free when he is conscious of the
choices he makes, and can only be responsible
for those choices when he chooses them freely.
(In other words, when they are in his conscious-
ness.)
4. To approach the world phenomenologically
means becoming conscious of your consciousness
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as you view the world, others and yourself.
The above assumptions were drawn from discussing the phenomenological
method and tracing its development. The development of phenomenological
method and the development of the concept of intentionality led to the exploration
of themes crucial to both phenomenology-existentialism and humanistic education.
Choice making, freedom, nothingness, responsibility and consciousness have
been shown to be central concerns of phenomenology and existentialism. They
are also concerns of humanistic education.
47
CHAPTER IV
THE UNIQUELY EXPERIENCING INDIVIDUAL
Introduction
The focus of this chapter will be on the uniquely experiencing individual
and try to offer support for the subjectivity and uniqueness of one’s experience.
The phenomenological method showed that the subjective pole of experience
was most important, and the one from which we viewed the world. This
chapter will try to offer scientific support for this assumption by examining
experiments in perception. After examining experiments by Rosenthal (1969),
Cantril (1959), Ames (1960) and others, I will then discuss the importance
of the following six things:
1. our brains.
2. our past experience.
3. our heredity.
4. our senses.
5. our eyes.
6. our language.
The final parts of this chapter will discuss, because of the uniqueness
of experiences, how we each create our own meanings and subjective and
objective reality.
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Experiments in Peception
In T.hg Phenomenological Problem , Carl Rogers tries to explicate the
relationship of phenomenology and perception, Rogers in an article, "The
Organization of Personality, " comments on a point made by Snygg and Combs,
two of the leading phenomenologists. Snygg and Combs in Individual Behavior
point out that it is the perceptual field which determines behavior and the
object for study "would be the person and his world as viewed by the person
himself, " Rogers believed then that it might mean that by turning our attention
to the laws that govern perception we might better learn the laws that govern
behavior (Rogers, 1959). Rogers in the same article hypothesizes "that
behavior is not directly influenced or determined by organic or cultural factors,
but primarily, (and perhaps only) by the perception of these elements,
"
(ibid).
A good general hypothesis then is that a close relationship exists between
behavior and how reality is viewed by the person (ibid). This clearly supports
the phenomenological view of looking at the world from a personal and unique
perspective.
The Senses and Past Experience
Hadley Cantril in an article, "Perception and Interpersonal Relations, "
(Kuenzli, ed., 1959), tells of an interesting series of experiments on perception
and interpersonal relations. This story is about a friend of Cantril's a
distinguished lawyer, who went to see Ames' demonstrations. Cantril takes
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them to see the "distorted room" designed by Ames, which produces the same
image on the retina as a regular square room if it is viewed monocularly from
a certain point (Cantril, 1959). People within the room or objects within the
room become distorted because the room is seen as square. This distortion
is also true of people looking through the windows. Cantril had shown this
room to hundreds of people and it had been demonstrated that when two people
looked through the back windows, the head of one individual appeared very
large, the head of the other to be very small. However, the size of the people’s
heads appeared to the observer to change when they reversed the windows they
were looking through, (Cantril, 1959).
On this Sunday morning something unusual happened. The friend's wife
was observing Cantril and her husband and said, "Well, Louis, your head is
the same size as ever, but, Hadley, you've become awfully large." Cantril
recalls that a shiver went up his spine and he asked her how she saw the
room.
It turned out that for her - unlike any other observer until then - the room
had become somewhat distorted. In other words, she was using her husband -
to whom she was particularly devoted, as her standard. She would not let
him go. His nickname for her was "Honi, " and this has been dubbed the
"Honi phenomenon, " (Cantril, 1959).
Dr. Warren Wittreich in a series of experiments with married couples
systematically observed the "Honi phenomenon. " He found that in people
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married for a long time there was greater and quicker distortion than in
couples married for less than a year. In the newly married couples there was
a very definite tendency not to let the new marital partner distort as quickly
or as much. Preliminary investigations on children, he reported, "seem to
show that parents of young children will not allow their children to distort as
readily as will parents of older children, " (ibid).
Cantril believes that we could continue for some time reporting experiments
which seem to show that what we perceive is in large part our own creation
and depends on the assumptions we bring to the particular occasion. We seem,
according to Cantril, to give meaning and order to sensory impingements in
terms of our own needs and purposes, (ibid).
It is evident that an understanding of phenomenology is impossible without
an understanding of perception. A little known man, Adelbert Ames, Jr.
,
seemed to have done some remarkable work in this field. Ames, whose
Morning Notes
,
(1960) a collection of his theories, experiments on perception,
seems to have the most impressive credentials d any educationist of recent
times. Alfred North Whitehead called him an "authentic genius." Others who
recognized Ames' significance are Albert Einstein, John Dewey, Hadley
Cantril and Earl Kelley (Postman and Werngartner, 1969).
Ames' experiments with oddly shaped rooms, windows, tables, chairs
and other objects, which seemed to distort reality when perceived by ordinary
people, showed further that our perceptions come from us, not from the things
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around us. This does not mean that there is no objective reality, nothing
outside our skins, but that whatever is out there can not be known except as
it is filtered through a human nervous system, (ibid).
The second thing that Ames proved was, what we perceive is largely a
function of our previous experiences, our assumptions, and our purposes
(ibid). This means that one perceives what one needs and wants to perceive.
In the New York Times
,
August 8, 1967, was the following story which clearly
illustrates the above point, (Postman and Werngartner, 1969).
Robert Rosenthal, a social psychology professor at Harvard reported
that after tests "rats performed far better when the experimenters were told,
falsely, that the rats had been bred for intelligence," (ibid). When the
experimenters were told the rats were dull, the same kind of rats turned in
consistently poor performances. Rosenthal then tested school children and
got what he termed similar results, (ibid).
A random sample of first and second grade children at a South San
Francisco elementary school, who it was predicted would make dramatic gains
in school work, actually made those gains, while the rest of the student body
did not. Only the teachers and not the pupils or parents had been told of the
predictions. Although, for ethical reasons, it was not predicted that any
child would turn out dull, Professor Rosenthal believes that his tests piovide
important evidence supporting the common thesis that many children, particularly
minority-group children, turn out dull because their teachers expect them
to
to be dull.
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Ames third point is that "we are unlikely to alter our perceptions until
and unless we are first rated in our attempts to do something based on them. »
This ooes not mean that if we are first rated when acting on our perception
that we will automatically change our perceptions. It does mean that
alternatives are availaole and the ability to relinquish inappropriate per-
ceptions and develop new ones is learning, (Postman and Wangartner, 1969).
The fourth point is that each individual perceives what is out there in a
unique way. This is true because our perceptions comes from us and our
past experience, (ibid). "We have no common world and communication is
possible only to the extent that two perceivers have similar purposes,
assumptions, and experience," (ibid).
This is similar to Snygg's, two principles of a phenomenological system.
"Behavior is completely determined by and pertinent to the phenomenological
field of the behaving organism, and there is some relationship between the
phenomenological fields of different individuals, " (Snygg, 1959). If this is an
accurate description of characteristics of a phenomenological system, then
we truly do live in different worlds, simply because our perceptions of things
are so different.
I was involved in entering my son’s world the other day and to understand
this principle after the following thing happened. Today I brought home from
the library, three books for my three year old son. My son cannot read, but
this book was a book without words. It was a book of visual discrimination
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exercises. A surprising thing happened when he began to name the shapes
he saw. He understood the concepts of triangle, square, rectangle, and
circle, all of which he had recently learned on Sesame Street. It made him
very happy to identify the following shapes which were on page one:
1 2 3
4 5
On page two, several shapes which I thought he had never seen before were
pictured. The following is page two:
4 5
6
54
A surprising thing happened. He was supposed to find the picture that
conesponded to Figure One. When he looked at Figure One, he immediately
yelled "I" or "eye" and put his face over the paper with his eye covering the
"eye" in Figure One. He did the same thing when he discovered that Figure
Six also contained to his world or his eye or his perceptual field an "eye. "
After a short discussion with my wife who looked into my eyes and
discovered the shape to correspond exactly to the shapes in Figures One and
Six, we then entered my son’s world - the eye is my eye, according to her.
The Eye
Studies of the eye, by J. B. Eccles, a Nobel prize winner, offers evidence
to support the uniqueness of one's perceptions. According to Eccles, man
doesn't really sense the world, he perceives it. It often happens that different
sensations lead to the same interpretations. A man reading a book with eyes
and a blind man reading the same book with his fingers perceive the same words.
Perception is derived from sensations, and in this way man tries to under-
stand his world. It is a misconception that the blind develop supernormal
touch. There are high concentrations of nerve endings in the fingertips, lips,
and nose tip sufficient to feel every dot of Braille in all human beings. Studies
at McGill University have shown that the blind have urgert motive to develop
their other senses. It is subject to his perception of reality that the motive
or the way he perceives that develops. Another astonishing discovery of two
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women in Russia and one in the United States who are capable of distinguishing
colors with their fingertips shows how great the possibilities our sense organs
might possess.
Vision is commonly explained as
an image on my retina, which is transmitted by
nerve fibers in each of my optic nerves, and that
the information so travelling to the visual cortex
of my brain gives rise to some specific pattern
of activity, woven in space and time by the activity
of the nerve cell. In some mysterious way, this
pattern gives rise to experiences that are projected
out into space, and, lo, there is the room visualized
by me, (Eccles, 1968, p. 108).
According to Sir John C. Eccles, who received the Nobel Prize in
medicine as the result of a lifetime of brain research, this explanation is
only partly true. What we can say, according to Eccles, is that "when there
is a specific patterned activation of the nerve cells in my brain, I have a
conscious experience, that somehow is derived from these specific events,
(ibid).
Eccles believes that visual perception is not an inborn property of the
nervous system but that "the visual world is an interpretation of retinal data,
that has been learned through association with information from sense organs,
particularly those of muscles, joints, skin and the inner ear, and is the end-
product of a long effort of progressive learning by trial and error (ibid).
In experiments conducted by Von Sendin, well documented accounts of
adult given patterned vision for the first time after removing from their eyes
congenital cataracts. The people reported:
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. . o that their initial visual experiences were meaningless
and quite unrelated to the spatial world that had been built
up from touch and movement. It took many weeks and even
months, of continual effort to derive from visual experiences
a perceptual world that was congruous with their
'kinaesthetic world, ' and in which, as a consequence, they
could move with assurance, (Eccles, 1968, p. 111).
These experiments show that when we think that we perceive the visual
world objectively as it really exists in three dimension and the properties color
form and texture, we really see things arising from our own conscious
experiences.
Such perceptual experiences arise because of the coded
information that is fed into the brain by our sense organs,
there to produce spatio-temporal patterns of activation
of our brain-cells, and which we learned throughout life
to interpret in order to give a valid picture of the world
in which we live, (ibid).
Eccles further states:
The example of color-blindness illustrates in a most
pointed manner the amazing dominance of the majority
agreement and the commonsense way of repressing the
minority of disagreement. This method works out well
for the crude levels of perception, using simple criteria
of perceptual recognition with nothing more subtle than
color matching; but there are immense divergences in
the perceptual experiences of individuals, when it comes
to highly-sophisticated performances such as occur with
philosophical arguments, with aesthetic judgments in
music, the plastic arts, and literature, and even with such
learned skills as tea and wine tasting, and the evaluation of
design and decor, (ibid, p. 112).
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This position eliminates the existence of an objective reality or external
world and makes the perceptual world the only one which exists:
For example, colors, sounds, smells, tastes, heat and
cold, as such, belong only to the perceptual world, and
have no existence in the external or 'objective' world.
Furthermore, it is part of my interpretation of my per-
ceptual experience that my 'self' is associated with a
body that is in the objective world; and I find innumerable
other bodies that appear to be of like nature, (Ecclesj p. 113).
The Brain
William Penfield a neurosurgeon, offers biological evidence to support the
psychological evidence that our perception "comes from us and our past
experience, " (Postman and Weingartner) and adds the functioning of the brain
to support the two other assumptions of phenomenological-perceptual theory.
The list now reads that we perceive what we perceive:
1. Depending on our senses
2. Our past experience
3. Our brains
4. Our eyes
Penfield, found that by stimulating the cortex of the brain with a weak electric
current transmitted through a probe "could force recollections clearly derived
from the patient's memory, " (Harris, 196 9). The experience stopped when the
electrode was withdrawn but the experience repeated itself when the electiode
was reapplied.
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One of Penfield's conclusions was that the electrode didn't evoke "as
mixture of memories or a generalization" but a single recollection (Harris,
1969) . Penfield further concluded that the response to the electrode was
involuntary.
Not only were the past events recorded in detail in the cortex of the
brain, but "the feelings associated with those events" are recorded in the
brain also. The event along with the feeling produced by the event are
"inextricably locked together in the brain so that one cannot be evoked without
the other. " This means that a person feels the same emotion "which the
situation originally produced in him" and is aware, whether true or false of
the same interpretations which he "gave to the experience in the first place, "
(Harris, 1969). According to Harris, "recollections are evoked by the stimuli
of day-to-day experience in much the same way that they were evoked artifically
by Penfield's probe. " If day-to-day experiences are evoked in much the same
way as Penfield's probe, then what persons perceive is clearly unique.
Heredity
The importance of this view of perception is clear. It seems to show
clearly that there is along with the psychological basis for perception, as shown
by the distortions in Cantril's husband and wife perceptions, also a biological
component coupled with this. This biological component is attested to Dr.
Holgar Hyden, (ibid).
The capacity to recall the past to consciousness can certainly be expected
59
to reside in a primary mechanism of general biological validity. A firm link
to the genetic mechanism is important, and in this respect especially, the RNA
molecule, with its many possibilities, would fulfill many requirements (ibid X
This adds heredity to the three things already mentioned as determining
our perception. If both a biological and psychological component are part of
our perceiving, then the brain and its functioning play a crucial part in what we
see. The brain seems to have many functions, and what Penfield believes is
that the brain functions like a tape recorder, where past experiences are
recorded and the feelings associated to those experiences "inextricably locked
to those experiences. " This data, which is locked in the recording mechanism
of the brain, is recalled and relived and determines "the nature of today's
transactions. " Harris further believes that "much of what we relive, we
cannot remember, and he illustrates this point.
She felt herself in the grip of a sadness she could not
understand, the intensity of which was almost unbearable.
Nothing in her conscious thought could explain this.
After she described the feeling to me, I asked her if there
was anything in her early life that this song reminded her
of. She said she could not make any connection between
the song and her sadness. Later in the week she phoned
to tell me that, as she continued to hum the song over and
over, she suddenly had a flash of recollection in which she
saw her mother sitting at the piano and heard her playing
this song. The mother had died when the patient was five
years old. At that time the mother's death had produced
a severe depression, which had persisted over an extended
period of time, despite all the efforts of the family to help
her transfer her affection to an aunt who had assumed the
mother role. She had never recalled hearing this song or
remembering her mother's playing it until the day she
walked by the music store, (Harris, 1967, p. 7).
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This story illustrates another of Penfield’s very important conclusions
that even after the subject no longer has the ability to recall the memory, the
memory record continues intact. It is clear that much of what we perceive is
clearly dependent not only on our heredity, but on our senses and our past
experiences and our brain. The importance of the brains functioning cannot
be underrated in the examination of perception.
Language
Language also affects the perceptions and particularly our language
abstraction. It is Korzybski's view that our language abstractions are derived
from a particular point of view. It is because of this point of view that
distortions in meaning take place. It is only by becoming aware of our habitual
use of language that we can understand that our language is not always an
accurate tool to describe the real world. As Korzybski points out:
The degree to which we are conscious of abstracting. . .
becomes a key problem in the way we evaluate and
therefore to a large extent, may affect the way in
which we perceive, (1951, p. 190).
It is because of this that Korzybski uses what he calls extensional devices
to increase our awareness of our abstracting.
Kelly and Cody give an example of what happens when a child is frightened
by a large dog. The large dog might make a child generalize about all dogs
and the word "dog. " Dog, being a linguistic sign, certainly influences the child s
perceptions of dogs in the future. When the child sees a dog, large or small,
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vicious or Kind, he may generalize the linguistic sign into a perceptual
(Kelly and Cody, 1969).
sign.
We now have a list of six things that determine what we perceive:
1. our brains.
2. our past experience.
3. our heredity.
4. our senses.
5. our eyes.
6. our language. “ 1
We can see that our perceptions come from us and are determined by
our brains, our eyes, our past experience, our language, and our heredity.
Ic is a determined field unless we are able to transcend our perceptual field
by being conscious of that field.
Objective and Subjective reality
It could be agrued that there certainly is an objective "reality," reality
that all people see or feel. If one hundred people dipped their hands into a
pitcher of boiling water, all wbula feel the warmth and have their hands burnt.
(Possible exceptions: People under hypnosis or drugged.)
In this sense there is an objective reality. In another sense there are
only many subjective realities, since each person feels the water
is evident that "reality" as perceived by senses is very personal,
individual’s perception can be very different from any other indivi
separately, it
and eacn
dual dependent
upon the perceiver.
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If we can approach the objective world by means of definitions and
approximately define a "cornfield 1 ' as a piece of ground on which cereal is
cultivated, if the cornfield" is the so-called objective reality, then in what
sense is it objective? When a farmer looks at a cornfield, the sees it in terms
of his specific interest. The farmer wants to make a living and sees the corn-
field as the field he cultivated and a place where corn grows. A merchant
looking at the field would probably estimate the gain he would derive from
handling the crop. Lovers would choose the field as a place to withdraw from
the world, and have no interest in its monetary value. A painter would become
enthusiastic about the colors and harmonies of light and shade; but to a pilot who
needs to make a forced landing, the cornfield and the corn serves only as a
wind indicator. The agronomist has neither the lover's, the painter's, nor the
pilot's view of the cornfield. He only considers the chemical composition of
the soil. The six people have six different spheres of interest. They are
interested in such objects of the outer world as are apt to gratify their different
needs, and only by coincidence is the cornfield the object common to their
different spheres of interest, (Peris, 1966).
It seems evident that the scale of observation creates the phenomenon.
Every time we change the scale of observation, we encounter new phenomena.
To the naked eye a razor blade appears as a straight line. When the
razor blade is observed under the microscope, it is a broken but solid line.
If we use the chemical scale to observe the razor, we have atoms 01 iron and
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carbon; and on the subatomic scale; we see electrons in perpetual motion
traveling at the rate of several thousand miles per second, (DeNouy, 1947)
Bertram Russel stated a similar view:
We all start from ’’naive realism," i.e.
,
the doctrine
that things are what they seem. We think that grass is
green, that stones are hard, and that snow is cold.
But physics assures us that the greenness of grass,
the hardness of stones, and the coldness of snow are
not the greenness, hardness, and coldness that we
know in our own experience but something very
different. The observer, when he seems to himself to
be observing a stone, is really - if physics is to be
believed - observing the effects of the stone upon him-
self. Thus, science seems to be at war with itself -
when it most means to be objective, it finds itself
plunged into subjectivity against its will, (Russell, 1946, pp. 14-15).
Russell further states in The Act of Creation :
that all the animals that have been carefully observed
have behaved so as to confirm the philosophy in which
the observer believed before this observations began.
Nay, more, they have all displayed the national
characteristics of the observer. Animals studied by
Americans rush about frantically, with an incredible
display of hustle and pep, and at last achieve the
desired result by change. Animals observed by German's
sit still and think and at last evolve the situation out
of their inner consciousness
,
(Koestler, 1964, pp. 32-33).
The sphere of interest of Peris is another term for Eccles' perceptual
field, or Snygg and Combs principles of a phenomenological field, or Russell's
and Lecomte de Nouy's scale of observation.
It is only possible to transcend our fields if we are conscious of our
subjective reality and our subjective perceptions. When you realize that you
are realizing something at that moment transcendence is possible. A woman
listening to some nonsense words claimed this nonsense word was saying I
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hate God. I hate God. Over and over again. It was later revealed that this
woman came from a very religious family and was forced to pray and love god
from early childhood. It was during this session that she realized the reason
for hearing this and transcended her field and made a new contact. This
transcendance helped her escape her limited phenomenological field.
Meaning Makers
We all create our own meanings and always are making or giving meanings.
Our perceptions of the world, the people around us, and ourselves, determine
what that meaning will be. It is our perceptions which determine our meaning
and our perceptions which make up our phenomenological field. The way we
perceive the world determines both our meanings and our phenomenological-
perceptual field.
We are always making meanings, and experiments in altered states of
consciousness have shown that we can transcend our meanings or our
perceptions and give new meaning based on new perceptions. The transcending
of our perceptual field is achieved by awareness. When we see things differently
or have many views of the same thing, we are changing our phenomenological
field into a new field and thereby become a different existential self.
Once again, then, our freedom depends on our awareness. The aware-
ness of our perceptions and our phenomenological field helps us to transcend
the limits of our perceptions and phenomenological field and to become
existential beings who can choose more freely. The assumption of the uniquely
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experiencing individual appears to have been validated by the data in this
chapter.
Summary
This chapter attempted to offer support for, and continue developing a
philosophical and psychological base for humanistic education. It attempted
to offer scientific support for the assumption that each individual is unique
and experiences himself (subjective), the world (objective), and others
(interpersonal or phenomenological) from his own subjective view point.
The subjectivity of this viewpoint was reinfoced by examining six
things: our brains, our past experience, our heredity, our senses, our eyes
and our language.
It was concluded because of the unique way in which one views the world
that meanings are created by perceiving the world in such a way. Each man
creates his own meanings on the basis of his perceptions. However, one is
free to become conscious of one's perceptions and thereby transcend those
perceptions and create new and different meanings.
The major assumptions extraplated from this chapter are:
1. Each person is unique and perceives the world in a
unique way.
2. Each person creates his own meaning because of the
way he perceives the world.
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3. One can transcend his perceptual field (perceptions)
by becoming conscious of his perceptual field.
The assumptions extrapolated from this chapter and the previous
chapter serve as the foundation for humanistic education.
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CHAPTER V
HUMANISTIC EDUCATION
Introduction
In this chapter I will show the focus, importance and objectives of
humanistic educators by comparing it with traditional education. I will also
show how the following assumptions extrapolated from phenomenological-
existential and perceptual theory serve as the philosophical and psychological
foundation for psychological (humanistic) curriculum, and how humanistic
educators attempt to implement these concepts with psychological curriculum.
Thus far we might summarize the assumptions, extrapolated from
phenomenological-existential and perceptual theory, that may serve the
foundation of psychological curriculum as follows:
Therefore psychological
curriculum would have to
focus on the uniqueness of the
individual and his singular
way of processing the world.
Therefore there must be a
greater emphasis on one's
subjective experience.
Metaphor, allegory symbol and
fantasy must be used to get in
touch with the subjective pole
because the subjective is
sometimes undiscussable,
(Morris).
1. Each person is unique and sees 1.
the world in a unique way.
(Chapter IV)
2. The subjective pole is the most 2.
important and the one which we
view everything from.
(Chapter III)
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3, To approach the world
phenomenologically means
becoming conscious of your
consciousness as you view
yourself, others and the world.
(Chapter III)
4. Each person creates his own
meaning, (Chapter IV)
5. Individuals live in many
conflicting worlds at the same
time. (Chapter III)
6. Free will is conceivable only if
there exists the possibility of
choice of alternative action and
the alternatives are known to
the chooser. (Chapter III)
7. Consciousness is crucial.
(Chapter III, IV)
3. Therefore humanistic education
attempts to make people more
conscious of their actions and
is concerned with the individuals
responses and choices.
4. Therefore psychological
education focuses on making-
one aware of the meanings
he assigns to people, himself,
and the world.
5. Therefore psychological
curriculum must make one
aware of the different levels
of existence possible.
6. Therefore humanistic education
focuses on increasing the
awareness as well as the
response-ability of the chooser.
7. Therefore humanistic education
focuses on putting students in
contact with their potential for
becoming conscious.
Education and Humanistic Education
If one of the tasks of education is to meet the emotional needs of children
then it is necessary that a conscious, controlled and planned for curriculum
be developed to help with the psychological problems that exist today.
Psychotherapists have realized that the traditional methods and settings which
they have been using are inadequate because of the magnitude of psychological
problems that exist today in our society. The amount of violence seems to
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prove that the long-term one-to-one therapeutic relationships often taking-
place in ideal environments are inefficient, (Alschuler, 1969).
Humanistic Education attempts to meet the psychological needs that
cannot be met by traditional methods and settings. Humanistic Education as
previously defined is curriculum that directly promotes psychological growth
in contrast to programs in which psychological growth is concomitant learning.
For example, a lesson taught on children of other lands first focuses on
the children of these lands. It is hoped that as a concomitant part of this
lesson children will understand differences in children they know, or children
in their class, but the primary learning is about children of other lands, The
primary learning in psychological curriculum aims at making self understanding
and relational capacities with others the primary objective and not a concomitant
component and therefore would probably not use as context children of other
lands, but something more direct such as having pupils examine their own
communication patterns with each other.
One of the major aims of education is behavioral change, and humanistic
education helps facilitate alternative ways of responding other than verbal
responses. When a person is either more conscious or aware of his responses,
he has an increased capacity for alternative ways of responding. By developing
this increased capacity, humanistic education makes possible experimentation
with a range of responses. Only when a person becomes aware of his response
patterns is it possible to have alternative ways of responding and his
70
response-anility. Humanistic education stems from the premise that self-
awareness and the "trying on" of alternative responses give one leverage for
controlling behavior and makes possible alternative ways of responding.
Humanistic Education attempts to make a person aware of his "RESPONSE-
ABILITY, gives nim the opportunity to try on new responses, and in so doing
increases the behavioral repertoire of that person.
What is called humanistic education offers promising alternatives to the
debilitating effects of current practice. Experimentation with new responses
is now viewed as a means to change both response and attitude. Of the issues
previously outlined, the major aim is to increase the response-ability to
himself and others.
Humanistic Education will not resolve all educational problems, but there
is an excellent probability that psychological education might make an important
contribution to developing more fully the potentials of both individuals and
communities. Education tries to help man become a better and more productive
human being. This is also the aim of the psychological educator. The
difference between a psychological educator and a non-psychological educator
is that the psychological educator attempts to facilitate the humanization
process by increasing one's intrapersonal and interpersonal awareness and
behavioral skills, mostly through experiential techniques. A psychological
educator tries to have a person experience intrapersonal awareness by
teaching a person, e.g.
,
relaxation, non-verbal behavior, body position, a
host of skills that facilitate this awareness, (Ivey and Rollin, 1970).
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The content of psychological education curriculum is also different in
that the individual and his personal experiences become the content. It is
clear that this new curriculum is needed for two reasons:
1. to meet the unmet psychological needs of students.
2. current knowledge is in such flux that the current
curriculum is practically useless.
Carl Rogers believes that the teaching in psychology will almost certainly
be out of date in 20 years. The 'facts of history’ really depend very largely
upon the current mood and temper of the culture. Chemistry, biology,
genetics, sociology, are in such flux that a firm statement made today will
probably be modified by the time the student gets around to using the knowledge,
(1956).
Traditionally education has either supposed what the interest of students
are and assigned students classes on the basis of breaking knowledge into
categories (i.e.
,
English, history, math and science) or more progressive
educators have allowed the students to select particular interests and work on
them. Earl Kelley describes the latter method in his book, The Workshop Way
of Learning
,
(1951).
As Weinstein points out, that educators were on the right track in
sensing the link between interests, needs and learning. In their reluctance
to deal with needs the interest curriculum become very limited because the
* r
curriculum is usually confined to present interests ana shuts out material in
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which learners could be interested, (Weinstein, and Fantini, 1970).
More important, the expressed interests of a student may not be what
really concern them. Weinstein gives an example of what concerns are in the
following story:
A teacher told the project staff that her class had an
almost compulsive interest in science. She was asked,
"What aspect of science?" "Evaporation, " she replied.
"The children seem utterly intrigued by evaporating
water. " After further questioning of the pupils, however,
we found that it was not evaporation as such that intrigued
the class but, rather, a concern with change, permanence,
and absence; they were saying, in effect, "if water can
disappear, can we?" Similarly, the interest expressed
by many boys in racing cars or strong athletes may
actually indicate concerns with power and control,
(1970, p. 27).
It is necessary to understand what is clearly meant by concerns and
interests. Concerns are deeper and more persistent and connote an inner
uneasiness that seeks cognitive assistance. Interests are not anxiety producing
and are more likely to be transitory, (ibid).
This inner uneasiness in a sense shows all concerns are negative. The
uneasiness signifies an imbalance or incomplete satisfaction. A person's
interests may give clues to his concerns. For example: "A person may have
interest (in say, urban poverty) and yet not be concerned; on the other hand,
his interest may give clues to concerns, " (ibid).
Ralph W. Tyler's Basic Principles of Curriculum and Instruction offers
two meanings of the term "need. " The first use he says "represents a gap
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between some conception of a desirable norm, that is, some standard of
philosoph c value and the actual status. " In this sense need represents the
’’gap between what is and what should be, ’’ (Tyler, 1949).
The second meaning for the term need is used by psychologists and
represents ’’tensions in the organism which must be brought into equilibrium
for a normal healthy condition of the organism to be maintained. " It is to
the second meaning which needs or concerns in psychological education are
directed.
There are three major patterns of concerns or needs which by definition
are ’’deep and persisting, " and the most direct and valuable cues to these
three major patterns of concerns are what the learners "say and write about
their lives. ” Non-verbal cues, which are more difficult for teachers to interpret
are also a valuable cue for finding concerns. Other cues (i.e.
,
profession
literature, general description of pasivity, alienation, folklore of a particular
sociological group) are less direct and are of limited value.
The three major patterns of concerns are:
1. Cues indicating self- rejection reflect a concern for
more positive self-concept.
2. Cues indicating disconnectedness reflect a concern
to establish connection with each other or with
society at large, to know where one fits in the
scheme of things.
3. Cues indicating powerlessness reflect a concern
for greater control over what is happening to
oneself, (Weinstein and Fantini, 1970).
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The non-humanistic educator aims the transmission of knowledge of the
external world such as driving a car or solving a math problem, in the hope
that these new skills will also help to make man a better and more productive
human being. The difference then between a psychological educator and a
non-psychological educator is that the psychological educator focuses on
deliberately increasing the intrapersonal awareness, interpersonal aware-
ness and the personal negotiations within these areas, and the non-psychological
educator aims at teaching performance skills, such as problem solving skills,
reading improvement skills or language facilitation skills, behaviors to which
Bloom’s Taxonomy Handbook I addresses itself.
The problem is that we do not have a conscious, controlled structure for
experiential curriculum that deals with the individual's concern for increasing
intrapersonal and interpersonal intentionality.
The central concepts of humanistic education are the key to understanding
the differences between psychological education and non-psychological education.
The differences are clear, and the rest of this chapter will show how
psychological education concepts can be implemented, the scope and what
different humanistic educators do and finally what all humanistic educators
have in common.
Bertrand Russell believes that education has three purposes; to provide
opportunities for growth; to give culture and develop one s capacities;
training useful citizens. Russell believes in a combination oi the abo\/e three
75
purposes as the goal of education, (Russell, 1946).
Humanistic educators in general focus their programs on providing
opportunities for growth and leaves the giving of culture and the development
of useful citizens in the realm of non-humanistic educators. If a person
becomes a useful citizen or gains culture this is concomitant to the humanistic
educator. In non-psychological education the emphasis is placed on giving-
culture and useful citizenry and only incidentally is concerned with personal
growth and the development of the self. The development of the self hopefully
takes place as part of the other processes. Eoth the means and purposes
of humanistic educators are different from traditional educators.
The implementation of the concepts of humanistic education is crucial
for understanding this field and it must be remembered that the humanistic
program is experiential and the following written description can only give
the flavor and not the meat of the program.
Focus on Uniqueness and Consciousness
Weinstein focuses mainly on assumption number one, i.e.
,
each
person is unique and sees the world in a unique way. He therefore uses
curriculum that focuses on the uniqueness of the individual and his singular
way of processing the world. He uses a schema called the Trumpet (See
Appendix A), which was developed by a Ford Foundation project field gioup,
and v/as used, adapted and refined by the Philadelphia Cooperative School
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Program, utilized to find a curriculum that was more relevant to the basic
psychological concerns of children than others in use, (Borton copyright in
Weinstein and Fantini, 1970).
The Trumpet begins with two steps called Confrontation and Uniqueness
.
It is these two steps that are a good example focusing on the uniqueness and
the singular way an individual processes the world.
A confrontation is used to allow a person or a child even, to be in a
confronting situation so they can generate data about themselves and the
unique way they experience this confrontation. The confrontation or encounter
is combined with the next part of the trumpet, Uniqueness.
An encounter can be different for many people. What may be an
encounter or confrontation for one person need not be an encounter of
confrontation for someone else.
What we hope happens in an encounter is that an inner experience results
from the meeting with another individual. It is this inner experience that
hopefully reveals itself to the person having it. This can happen to either of
the people involved because as was pointed out above, an encounter is different
for everyone, something new, different or unique. May points out that "an
encounter can bring a sudden liberation from ignorance or illusion, enlarge
the spiritual horizon, and give a new meaning to life, " (May, 1958). He
believes that in encounter, and here the uniqueness of the individual cannot be
separated, "something totally new is revealed, new horizons open, one
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weltanshaung is revised, and sometimes the whole personality is restructured, "
(ibid).
Step 2 - Uniqueness: This next part of the trumpet looks at how I
responded and since we all see the world differently and behave in unique ways
based on our perceptions of the world, it asks what was unique about my
response, wnat was not unique, or what was common about my response.
Humanistic education courses offer a chance for me to discover patterns
or unique patterns of responses, because the structure or organization of the
exercises are such that tney lead to the discovery of the uniqueness of
patterns of responses. The exercises are structured so that we can direct
our attention to discovering these patterns. The basic rule which is held to
that when using exercises is that "not upon knowledge alone rather upon
knowledge directed by purpose, " (Becker, 1960).
The exercises are always aimed at a purpose or goal and this direction
is what gives valuable information about that person’s uniqueness. Examples
of confrontation are shown in Exercises 1 - 11.
Examples of Exercises that Fascilitate Uniqueness and Mv Experiences .
(The parentheses are my personal reactions to the exercises.
)
Exercise 1.
Push your palms together. Eyes closed.
Push a train out of your way - eyes closed.
Mill around without speaking or touching.
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(I felt silly milling, and stayed on the fringes but tried to get in the
middle.)
Shake hands with your left hand and then examine with the right hand the
other persons left hand.
(I started to feel different. Felt we had to do this too many times.
Perhaps my discomfort was caused by shaking and examining too many men’s
hands. The women's hand I rather enjoyed.)
Exercise 2.
Seek out a partner that interests you.
(Really uninterested at this time.
)
Sit back to back, let your heads touch. Tell how you feel about being here.
(We could barely hear each other but we introduced ourselves when
we were allowed or told to face each other while still seated.)
Exercise 3.
Whisper two nicknames. Whisper back the names trying to evoke the feeling
this name had when you were called it. Explain to your partner why you had
this name and if it was pleasant or unpleasant. Why?
(Told my two nicknames and one of them really made me feel annoyed.
Annoyed like when I was called that name as a kid. The name was "Spaces. "
I was called that because my teeth had never grown in. My other nickname,
the one I got because I was leader of the guys, though it does embarrass me
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out of their company, so I won't reveal it. I rather enjoyed recalling it.)
Exercise 4.
Gather in group and one partner tells the last time they felt free.
(This caused me difficulty. I really wonder how meaningful my life was
when I was having trouble thinking of this. Then I remember the time I got
on a plane and flew to Brazil to write the great American novel and chase this
great Brazilian woman. The other time, and it seemed odd to me, was when
I got married. Not during or before, but when the ceremony was over and
Vivian and I were driving away. I really felt loose. I felt free when I was
coming to Amherst.
)
Exercise 5.
Tell anyone if you felt their rememberance of freedom was truthful. Then its
your turn to enter the circle.
(no record.
)
Now we then did a feeling wheel.
At peace
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(happy - I feel content and relaxed; loose - I would like to hear some music
and do a little dancing; calm - after a lot of dancing I sit down and feel calm
or at east; at peace - I feel no weights or pressure.)
Exercise 6.
Weinstein then introduced the concept of geography and asked us to go through
the table of contents in relation to our bodies.
What are your imports and exports?
(Food - sperm used to produce kids and sperm given - secondary
friendship. Exports - sweat, waste.)
Exercise 7.
What is your climate ?
(Stormy - great flucutation of hot and cold - depends on mood and
time of day.
)
Where are your slums?
(My hands for loving to violence - express both extremes.
)
Exercise 8.
What is most productive area?
(My testicles, the kids we have whenever we want; the writing of my
novel or book which has meaning only to myself; this is creative as opposed
to reading or intellectualizing.
)
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Exercise 9.
Unfinished Business.
(What haven't I said or done that I wanted to say or do with someone
else or myself. This exercise is one that is used continually throughout the
course.
)
Exercise 10.
The group draws a composite picture using each member's body parts.
(A. List of things of mine which were selected: Shape of head -
liked the shape; eyes - everyones - one person liked each others eyes for
shape; mouth - shape; arms and shoulders - strong and sturdy yet not too
muscular.
)
B. Things that surprised me.
(no record)
C. Things that they didn't like, or I was self conscious about and
hoped group would ignore.
(Legs - too self conscious - calves are too thin.)
D. Disclose one thing that you were most self conscious about.
(my legs
.
)
Exercise 11.
Picture your body and double its size.
(Real big and much too large. Don't think I would like it.)
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Cut yourself into half size.
(Three feet tall. Small - tiny - little - scared - too small - defenseless.)
Add anything you wanted to it.
(hair on head - or more of it.)
Subtract something from your body.
(shave my hair off my head.)
Bodies in a bunch of pieces - what would be on top of the pile?
(Penis, head, heart, stomach, arms, legs, shoulders, hands, feet.)
Examine these parts - Why?
If you could multiply more things on your body, what would you multiply?
How many could you have ?
What materials would you build a new body out of? Not protoplasm.
(Rubber.
)
Changing the color of your body. What color would you select?
(Deep blue)
Your body cannot he used as a body - needs another function? What function
would that body be ?
(Spare parts
.
)
The major part of the exercises focus on each person's unique way of
experiencing themselves and the world.
The next part of the Trumpet focuses on #7 (The Crucial Nature of
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Consciousness) and tries to structure information so that it becomes
meaningful. The following are examples of the attempt to increase
consciousness.
Recognize Patterns - What are my patterns of behavior or what is
typical of me in this confrontation or encounter.
The feedback one gets about his patterns comes from a group of people
who he works with for the entire course. As yet there is no way of knowing
what group structure is best for one actualization. As Abraham Luchins
points out:
There is at present to test to indicate what kind of
group structure is most effective for one's actualization
process. Until research does develop them we need
to take an experimental approach with each individual
and see how the various structures in the group
affect him, (1964).
It is clear though, that if a person can discover this response patterns he
is certainaly a more aware, and he is possibly better able to choose.
The fifth step in the trumpet focus on assumption #4, i.e.
,
each person
creates his own meaning. In this step the curriculum attempts to make one
aware of the meanings he assigns to people, himself, and the world; by asking
him to concern the consequences of his behavioral patterns.
Step 5 - Consider Consequences - This step asks the person what happens
or what could happen to me in my life because of this pattern. Or from a
perceptual viewpoint what could happen to me because I see myself or the
world from this viewpoint.
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This program's limitations appear to be that its focus is on uniqueness
and consciousness and only briefly touches on the rest of the assumptions.
This may not however be a limitation but a recognition of the difficulty in
incorporating the seven assumptions into the program. Furthermore, this is
my perception of the program, and I am sure not the only one possible.
This brief description is incomplete and the course lasted about twelve
weeks. This program is not intended to replace existing educational programs,
but is intended as a supplement in the attempt to right the balance between
cognition and affect. It must be remembered that different psychological
education programs must be developed for use with different populations
and different age groups.
This however, is not the only kind of humanistic education that can be
experienced as Alschuler, one of the leading humanistic educators points out,
that psychological education as a discipline is unorganized psychological
education courses have even been developed and designed to increase
achievement motivation, (Alschuler, 1969).
The Subjective Pole - Consciousness
George Brown (University of California) focuses, for me, on assumption
number two: the subjective pole is the most important and the one which we
view everything from, and assumption number seven: consciousness is
crucial. He uses curriculum to deal directly with these assumptions. He
lists five goals of his workshop.
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1. To communicate to others some of the things that
we had discovered through the year.
2. To attempt to get others in education interested
in affective learning.
3. To begin to establish training models for later
use in training teachers in the use of affective
teaching techniques.
4. To demonstrate some ways in which we have been
coordinating and integrating affective and cognitive
learning, by having workshop members participate
in samples of these activities (1971).
5. To stimulate possible development of other programs
in affective education, (1989).
He then goes on to summarize what the basic planning for the weekend
will be. It includes elementary awareness training technique, encounter
groups, awareness training through Gestalt therapy and again more awareness
training. The entire weekend is dominated by training in awareness using
different techniques to facilitate this awareness, (ibid). As Brown later states,
'becoming aware of what causes us to choose certain groups can give us some
insight into ourselves,” (ibid).
In another exercise, Mr. Montz, a group leader asked that the group
close their eyes and "on the inside of their eyelids draw an imaginary road
map, ” (ibid). The group is then told that they are now on the left side of the
map; not in terms of location, but where you are in your life, your feelings
and your awareness of yourself.
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Martin Buber, one of the leading existential writers of the 20th century
tells a similar story. A rabbi who had been in jail is visited by the jail
keeper. The jail keeper begins to question the rabbi's belief in his God
because of the Book of Genesis. How can your God be so great and good, he
asks, if in the Book of Genesis he has to ask Adam: Adam where are you?
If your God was so smart and created the earth why doesn't he know
where Adam is ? The rabbi thought for a minute and replied: God is not
asking Adam where he is in terms of his location but is asking him where he
is in terms of his life. God in affect is saying, Adam, you've been alive for
forty years, where are you in life and in your awareness of yourself.
The Buber story and Mr. Montz's exercise of describing where you are
at not so much in terms of location as in terms of your life, your feeling and
your awareness, show the close, if not almost identical concerns, connection
between humanistic education and existentialism.
Later on in the session Brown describes awareness training, the using
of Gestalt therapy techniques. According to Brown and Janet Lederman,
co-leader of the Gestalt awareness groups, are used "to help the individual
take responsibility for himself and his action. " It further facilitates the
student to become aware of the resources outside and inside himself that are
available to him, (ibid).
87
#3 - Focus on Responses and Choices
Allen Ivey focuses, I believe, on the third assumption: to approach
the world phenomenologically means becoming conscious of your consciousness
as you view yourself, others and the world. He uses curriculum that is
directly concerned with the individual's behavioral responses and choices.
Ivey has developed a human relations course called The Human Relations
Performance Curriculum: A Commitment to Intentionality. His curriculum was
developed using behavioral objectives, (Ivey and Rollin, 1970). Behavioral
hierarchies have been established to help teachers learn human relations
skills, i.e.
,
relaxation, listenting and non-verbal skills.
Juxtaposed to these behavioral objectives is Ivey's concept of the
intentional teacher. Ivey calls this construct of the intentional teacher
existential. According to Ivey the intentional teacher has many "behavioral
options open to him, can decide which option seems appropriate, and can inter-
act with environment feedback to change the direction of his actions, " (ibid).
The intentional (existential) teacher is one who is aware of the situation, the
many possible choices in that situation, the many possible choices in that
situation, and can act on those choices. The intentional (existential) teacher
is one who can generate alternate responses in a given situation and 'come
at' the problem from different vantage points as he receives environmental
feedback, (ibid). The intentional (existential) teacher has more than one
course of action open to him and can at any moment respond to ever changing
life situations, (ibid).
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In order to act (existentially) with intentionality, one must have alternative
behaviors available. The performance curriculum in Human Relations
instructs beginning teachers in these specific human relations behaviors (ibid).
It is also possible to use the Trumpet to teach these particular behavioral
skills such as relaxation, attending, non-verbal or self-expressive skills.
For example, when the confrontation of a person is achieved we can ask them,
or they can observe themselves and see if they are relaxed. If they go on to
the next steps of the Trumpet we can ask them to verbalize their feeling of
uniqueness, the functions of their responses, and the petterns of response
they notice. They can also notice how they feel, relaxed or otherwise, when
people give them information or when they have to verbalize information about
themselves.
Ivey’s course certainly teaches awareness at the same level for me.
After learning how to relax, cue my non-verbal behavior, and attend, I can
make different choices.
For example, when I am confronted do I still relax? What happens to
my body? Do I still attend? Perhaps the Trumpet could be also used to see
how specific responses are affected by confrontation, and how awareness
can be increased by simply focusing on nothing but these skills. Ivey's concept
of the intentional teacher is existential, and intentionality is one of the major
concepts of phenomenology.
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Focus on the Subjective
Terry Borton uses exercises very similar to those described by Brown
earlier in this paper. He focuses on the subjective pole of experiencing the
world and uses metaphor, allegory symbol and fantasy to get in touch with
the subjective pole because the subjective is sometimes undi s cus sable.
He begins the article with an exercise which asks you to try and go back
to the sixth grade. He begins by asking you to close your eyes and relax. He
tells you that you are in the sixth grade. Let your mind rest there for a while.
It will probably be worthwhile for you, the reader, to try the following
exercise. Remember, you are in the sixth grade - relax.
Do you remember much about your old class? Do
you remember whether other people were close,
or far away? Were you warm or cold? Do you
remember where the class bully was sitting?
The boy with the mossy teeth? The one with the
snotty nose ? The kid who sucked his thumb?
Who supplied the dirty picture ? How did you feel
about him? Who were the special people? How
were you going to get near them? Who was the
teacher? Do you remember the lesson? . . . And
at the end of this paragraph, close your eyes again.
Let yourself drop down those years, until you find
your sixth-grade you. What was school like, really?
Stop, and give yourself time to remember it as you
experienced it. Stop, and allow yourself to remember
school as you experienced it, " (Borton, 1969, p. 594).
In this article that follows, Borton emphasizes his purpose of focusing
on the importance of feelings and attitudes in the classroom. He describes
James Coleman’s results in his mammoth survey, "Equality of Educational
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Opportunity, " Coleman concluded that of all the factors studied and these
factors included ’’family background, teachers salary, school facilities,
curriculum materials, attitudes such as interest in school, self concept, and
sense of control, showed the strongest relation to achievement," (Boston, 1969).
He points out similarly to Brown that besides the here and now feelings -
(here and now a key concept in Gestalt therapy) of the child, the child learns
not about psychology in general, but about his own specific feeling and actions
or behavior, (ibid).
Particular attention is paid to the child's fantasies, non-verbal
expression role-playing, ’’as a way of simulating behavior so that it can be
studied and changed, " (ibid), also taught in explicit fashion are the basic
principles of group dynamics so that a student can have more responsibility
for the conduct of their own affairs. Process in the structure of the classroom
is of paramount importance in brining about these changes, (ibid).
It is now clear that humanistic education is different from traditional
education and within the field of humanistic education there is great diversity.
However, the concepts described earlier in this chapter are generally part of
all humanistic education.
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Summary
In this chapter I have attempted to show that humanistic education is
different from traditional education. It is different in many respects. First
it is based on the assumptions of phenomenology, existentialism, and perceptual
theory, and therefore, tries to deal directly with the concerns of children
and increase their consciousness of themselves, others and the world.
I have also tried to show in this chapter that within the field of humanistic
education there is great diversity. This was shown by giving samples,
examples and my personal experience in some of these programs. The
humanistic educators, Ivey, Brown, Borton, and Weinstein are all interested
in the concepts described earlier in this chapter, but all use different methods
and focus on different concepts to achieve their aims.
The humanistic educators do not deal with all the assumptions extrapolated
from phenomenological-existential and perceptual theory. This assumes
that the assumptions are all very different, They are not all very different,
but overlap. It is this overlapping that makes it difficult to give order to
humanistic education. It will be remembered that the same was true with
existentialism and phenomenology. If humanistic education is like its
philosophical predecessor's phenomenological-existentialism perhaps it
cannot be ordered without diluting the educative process.
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AN ADDENDUM
It is my personal feeling that the stagnancy of education has been
tolerated for too long a period. If the purpose of education is to change the
behaviors of its learners; then why can’t the principle of change be applied
to the changer? Ihe change in education to which I am addressing myself is
a gieatei emphasis on the actual concerns of the students. I know the change
I am asking for is a momentous one. The roots of our present pedagogical
practice are rooted very deeply in the soil of our society. In spite of the
fact that I may not possess a lever, fulcrum and location with which to overcome
the inertia of schooling as it exists; I do have hope though.
If knowledge can be viewed as a search for self; I wonder why this very
same criterion cannot be applied to education. The vast majority of education
has avoided the self. This avoidance continues despite reports of incredible
success by teachers such as Sylvia Ashton-Warner (1S63) and Paul Freire
(1970). The success of this duo stemmed from the frontal attack they had
their students amass on their very selves. Maoirs of New Zealand and natives
of Brazil learning to read because they themselves chose the words that were
of the greatest personal concern. These two teachers dared to defy the age
old pedagogical taboo of dealing with the unreality of each individual student.
Their defiance was rewarded by success. The students who could see them-
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selves as individuals with individual concerns learned to read at a prodigious
rate, (Ashton Warnerl963, Freire, 1970). The lessons of existentialism,
phenomenology and perceptual theory have been ignored for too long. It is
my desire and ambition to make people, students, faculty and administrators
aware of these concerns and assumptions for their students as well as for
themselves.
My personal commitment extends far beyond this dissertation. I am a
product of the cognitive or so-called objective curriculum. I remember the
only interests I had in school were gym, cafeteria, fighting and girls. I took
three years of Spanish and can’t speak a word of it. I took four years of
math and can only do basic arithmetic; many years of English and began to
like to read only after completing high school. The only thing I remember
about biology is when girls can’t become pregnant and for some strange
reason the amoeba. After recently sitting in a high school history class I
recontacted the boll weevil. The stinking weevil is still taught while the real
concern of kids is ignored.
We still pay lip service to dealing with these concerns but never deal
with them. Sex, love, death are taboo subjects, but the boll weevil is not.
This dissertation represents my investigation and explorations into a
new field of education based on assumptions differing from those underlying
that of our present educational system, The best way I can describe what I
am going to do with that knowledge is to describe some of the components
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of a school based on these principles.
Formal Structure:
This school would be similar to Summerhill in that there would be no
required course sequence, attendance or grades. The children would describe
what they would do or learn. Since the faculty would come under the
existential umbrella of the school and pursue interests; it may well be that
some of these interests would serve as entry points for concerns of the
children.
Curriculum :
The primary purpose of the curriculum is to serve the interests of the
children and to make individuals aware of their concerns. Parameters
of study such as English, math, science and history might well be replaced
by subjects such as sex, love and death which I feel to be areas of paramount
concern to children, (Ashton-Warner, 1963).
The focus of the curriculum would be on intrapersonal (identity)
interpersonal (connectedness) and power concerns. This would mean, at times,
a structured set of experiences to generate data or a class where people
generate their own data and raise their own concerns. For this to happen an
atmosphere must be established where kids feel free enough to let out what's
really in their hearts and on their minds.
What I would like to do most now is stop writing and get out into the
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field and see what kind of different teacher I am now as opposed to what I
was before I returned to school.
APPENDIX A
THE TRUMPET
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